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RESTRICTIVE DISTRIBUTION ARRANGEMENTS:
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC
POLICY STANDARDS
LEE E. PRESTON*
Restrictive distribution arrangements result from agreements between suppliers
and reseller-buyers of merchandise in which one of the parties or both of them accept
limitations on the scope of managerial discretion with respect to certain marketing
practices, such as the selection of sales territories, customers, products, or prices.
Restrictive arrangements differ greatly in form and substance and in the particular
marketing contexts in which they are applied. The purpose of this paper is to
develop through economic analysis a framework for assessing the impact of such
arrangements, particularly those having to do with customers and territories, on
market competition. Within this framework, we then develop and illustrate a
standard for identifying those restrictive arrangements that are compatible with a
pro-competitive public policy.'
Restrictive distribution arrangements are intermediate forms of vertical market
control, between the extremes of no control (independent dealings) and complete
control (vertical integration). Neither the economic impact nor the public policy
status of such arrangements has been fully articulated, and at the present time vertical
marketing relationships of all sorts are undergoing economic, legal, and legislative
scrutiny.' Vertical price agreements are, of course, currently regarded as illegal
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restraints upon trade under section I of the Sherman Act, unless specifically pro-
tected by state law. Product restrictions (exclusive dealing and tying) are illegal
under section 3 of the Clayton Act where they "substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly . .. ." In 1948, the Department of Justice issued a policy
statement setting forth the view that territorial and customer restrictions were illegal
per se, and a number of informal contract modifications and consent judgments were
subsequently obtained However, several recent court proceedings indicate that this
extension of per se doctrine has not been accepted by the judiciary.
I
REsTRICTIVE ARRANGEMENTS AND COMPETITION
Any restrictive distribution arrangement transfers some of the decision-making
authority of one business unit into the control of another. An initial distinction
might be drawn between those formally restrictive agreements that do not, in fact,
alter the behavior of the controlled unit (or that restrict behavior only with respect
to peripheral activities, such as minimum stock levels, display requirements, and so
forth), and those which do restrict behavior in some important respect. The former
type of agreement (for example, one imposing a modest advertising requirement),
which appears to be very common in our economy, may simply represent a codifica-
tion of existing trade practices without any significant enforcement mechanism or
sanctions. Such agreements are restrictive in form but not in substance and may be
dismissed from further consideration.
Restrictive marketing arrangements may be adopted both singly and in combina-
tion to accomplish particular purposes. Taken individually, the principal types of
restrictions and their effects may be summarized as follows:
i. Customer-territorial restrictions limit distributors in their choice of customers
or sales areas; they thus reduce the direct competition between distributors of the
same line of products, although they may be used to extend market coverage to
customers to whom the products would not otherwise be made available. The
operation of this type of restrictive arrangement will be considered in detail below.
2. Resale price restrictions limit distributors in their choice of prices, and thus
shift competitive efforts into services, location, merchandising technique, or the
pricing of nonrestricted products. The impact of resale price maintenance schemes
largely depends upon, rather than determines, the strength of interproduct competi-
tion; however, resale price restrictions may contribute to the stability of vertical price
structures and may importantly affect the number and size of distribution outlets.
3. Product restrictions either compel distributors to carry other of the supplier's
'Travers & Wright, supra note i, at 796-97.
'Throughout this discussion we use the term supplier to refer to the firm on the selling side of the
market and distributor to refer to the reseller-buyer. This choice of terminology emphasizes the fact
that restrictive arrangements may arise at any vertical market level, e.g., between manufacturers and
wholesalers, wholesalers and retailers, industrial distributors and jobbers, and so on.
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products (tying) or prohibit them from carrying the products of others (exclusive
dealing) as a condition of their being allowed to purchase certain items for resale.
Product restrictions thus foreclose particular distributors as routes of market access
for competitive products and, as a result, may weaken competition among distribu-
tors directly. They may also weaken competition among suppliers by limiting the
market choices of distributors and final customers and by creating barriers to the
appearance of new products in the market.
Restrictive marketing arrangements of any sort thus limit competition in some
respect. However, as we shall illustrate in more detail below, limitations on com-
petitive activity in one direction may strengthen competitive forces in another.
The analysis of the over-all competitive impact of any particular pattern of marketing
arrangements involves a large number of variables and rests upon a number of
crucial distinctions. First, competitive structure, the presence of relatively large
numbers of independent decision units on both sides of a market, must be dis-
tinguished from competitive behavior, the aggressive pursuit of market opportunities
by each individual unit. Restrictive agreements are like mergers in that they can
only represent a reduction in the total number of independent decisions to be taken
in the market, ceteris paribus. The question for analysis in both cases, however, is
whether this departure from competitive structure within one marketing organiza-
tion is counterbalanced by an increase in the number of marketing organizations
and products available in particular markets or in the vigor of competitive behavior.
A second distinction is to be made between interbrand and intrabrand competition.
If all branded products were distributed directly by their manufacturers, we would
not expect any intrabrand competition to develop in the market. However, when
the products of many manufacturers are distributed through independent, and
usually multiproduct, distribution outlets, the prices of individual products become
elements in the over-all competitive strategy of these firms. Their "enterprise
competition"5 involves the sale of complex assortments of goods and services and
the attraction and retention of customer patronage over time. Thus, intrabrand
competition arises because of differences in the cost and demand conditions facing
various distributors and their differing responses to market opportunities. Re-
strictive arrangements with respect to any product limit, and may completely elimi-
nate, the use of that product as a vehicle of enterprise competition among dis-
tributors. However, whether this has any perceptible effect on the vigor or char-
acter of competition over-all will depend upon many other factors. Among the
most important of these are the presence of alternative brands (and the strength
of interbrand competition) and the variety and importance of service, location, and
other nonprice elements of competitive strategy.
A closely related matter is the interaction between horizontal and vertical
market relationships. The present state of economic analysis does not, in general,
'This term was coined by Dean E. T. Grether.
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permit us to specify the impact of changes at one of several vertically related market
levels upon structure and behavior at another. Even were a fairly detailed analysis
possible, there is far from universal agreement as to the public policy criteria to be
applied in choosing among several possible multi-market patterns of competitive
forces. In general, there is some presumption that competitiveness in "final" markets
is the primary public policy consideration, but this criterion is not fully satisfactory
because (a) the identification of any one market as "final" becomes somewhat am-
biguous with respect to products other than nondurable consumer goods and (b)
some reduction in competition in final markets (e.g., limitation on intrabrand
competition) may be associated with the maintenance or increase of competitive
alternatives in intermediate markets.
Finally, there is a distinction to be drawn between the balance of competitive
forces throughout a broad market and the strength or weakness of bargaining
positions of particular buyers vis-a'-vis particular sellers. For example, when either
party to a transaction has come to rely upon the other for more than the normal
provision of merchandise and service available elsewhere in the market, the de-
pendent party's bargaining position becomes weakened, and the dominant party may
attain a power of coercion over this particular trading partner in no way paralleled
in its dealings with other enterprises. The illegality of contractually exercised
coercive power, quite apart from any association with market-wide monopoly, has
been recently affirmed in Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co! and Simpson v. Union Oil
Co. In both cases, suppliers were using their power over dealers to force the
acceptance of restrictive marketing arrangements (tying in the first instance, con-
signment selling in the second). In neither case was it shown that competition in
final product markets---oil and gasoline-was directly affected by the arrangements.
II
NONCOLLUS vE RFsTucTIoNs ON SALS TERmuTopEs AND CUSTOMERS
This paper focuses primarily on the economic impact and public policy status of
restrictive arrangements involving the limitations of distributors in their selection
of sales territories or customers. We omit detailed consideration of resale price
restrictions, except as they may be involved in our primary topic, because they have
been the subject of extensive analysis for some thirty years and their legal status as
per se violations, except where specifically exempted by state law, seems reasonably
secure and appropriate Product restrictions in the form of tying contracts are
0 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
y377 U.S. 13 (1964).
'The economics profession, with very few exceptions, has been generally critical even of legalized
resale price maintenance. The typical argument is well summarized by Bain, who recommends the
repeal of state fair trade laws and federal enabling legislation. BAIN, op. cit. supra note I, at 565-67,
627; a similar suggestion is made by KAYsEaN & TURNER, op. cit. supra note x, at =2-i3. The Out-
standing economist proponent of fair trade, as a source of countervailing (or perhaps only equalizing)
power for small business, has been Walter B. Adams. Cf. Adams. Resale Price Maintenance: Fact and
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covered in another contribution to this symposium; exclusive dealing restrictions,
which are frequently associated with customer-territorial restrictions, require some
specific comment below. In general, the several types of restrictions may be used
both jointly and as alternative means of accomplishing the same managerial ob-
jective.
Territorial and other customer restrictions may be analyzed together because they
have the common effect of limiting the distributor in his choice of customers,
according to their trade designation, size, location, or other characteristics. Terri-
torial restrictions, the most familiar form of simple franchise, have given rise to a
number of significant recent court cases, and the territorial feature is emphasized
in much of this discussion; however, the argument should be read as equally
applicable to the limitation of choice of customers on any other basis.
The focus of this symposium on single-firm conduct excludes a detailed con-
sideration of the use of restrictive distribution arrangements in a context of horizontal
collusion or conscious parallel action. It might, however, be argued that all restrictive
arrangements of any significance contain, at least by implication, a collusive aspect.
Distributors who are parties to such agreements are generally aware that parallel
arrangements are being made with their potential competitors; thus, the granting of
an exclusive franchise to a distributor is an implicitly collusive quid pro quo for
his acceptance of a limited territorial or customer outreach. This is, in essence, the
crux of the argument for the extension of per se standards of illegality to cover
restrictive arrangements of all types. We would distinguish here, however, between
(i) a horizontal conspiracy implemented through a vertical agreement and (2) a
single firm's (e.g., a supplier's) development and implementation of a system of
vertical agreements for the accomplishment of its own marketing goals. Current
public policy does not differentiate the two cases in so far as price agreements are
concerned.9 However, in his concurrence in White Motor, Mr. Justice Brennan
explicitly distinguished "two traditionally outlawed forms of restraint-horizontal
market division and resale price maintenance"--from "territorial restraints . ..
imposed upon unwilling distributors by the manufacturer to serve exclusively
his own interest."'1 The latter were, in his view, presumably legal.
Fancy, 64 YAaE L.J. 967 (1955)- Other recent contributions analyzing the impact of fair trade prac-
tices in a managerial context are Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J. LAw &
Ecomr. 86 (ig6o); Gould & Preston, A Model of Resale Price Maintenance, 32 EconoN11CA 302 (x965).
'KAYsEN & TURNER, op. cit. supra note I, set forth some explicit standards for the appraisal of
per se rules and accept the validity of this approach with respect to price-fixing, atihough not with
respect to tying contracts or exclusive dealing. They do not deal specifically with customer-territorial
restrictions. Turner, writing alone, offers purpose and power to restrain competition as a test for
identifying per se illegal tie-in arrangements, although he leaves some classes of arrangements for
case-by-case analysis. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72
-ARv. L. REv. 5o, 62 (1958). The validity of per se rules even in the price-fixing context has been
strongly challenged by the economic analysis of Almarin Phillips. See his MARKET STRUCTURE, ORGANI-
ZATION AND PERFORMANCE chs. io-i (1962).
"0 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 266-67 (1963).
RESTRICTIvE DISTRIBUTION AMANGEMENTS 511
Absent horizontal conspiracy, restrictive distribution arrangements arise because
distributors, left to their own devices, do not behave as a supplier would wish and,
as a result, the goals of the supplier are not realized through the independent action
of competitive distributors in the market.
The motives of a supplier in introducing restrictive marketing arrangements may
be many and varied, but the following are frequently cited in the literature and
court proceedings:11
i. To obtain market access-Distributors may be unwilling to handle a supplier's
product unless they are partially insulated against intrabrand competition; thus,
distribution outlets in any one submarket may be obtainable only if restrictions
are imposed on the activities of potential competitors. This consideration is par-
ticularly significant when the distributors are required, either by economic considera-
tions or trade practices, to deal exclusively in the supplier's product. 12
2. To increase product exposure-If final market sales are strongly affected by
the number and convenience of distribution outlets carrying the product, then the
supplier may wish to limit each outlet to minimum feasible size and increase the
number of outlets to a maximum.
3. To increase total distributors' sales effort-Any particular amount or quality
of sales effort might be spread widely through a market or concentrated on narrowly
defined customer groups. Customer-territorial restrictions are frequently designed
to motivate distributors to increase their depth coverage of narrowly defined markets
rather than "skimming" choice customers over a wider area.12
4. To determine quality and character of distributor service and to achieve other
merchandising ends-In order to engage in brand name promotional activity on a
continuing market-wide scale, a supplier may wish to obtain both specific character
and quality and a considerable degree of uniformity in the operations of its dis-
tributors, including not only pre-sales service but also post-sales and replacement
responsibility, ancillary merchandising activity (e.g., local advertising), and so forth.
Restriction of customer groups, territorial or otherwise, to specific distributors may
contribute to these goals, either because the distributors independently accept the
" It is sometimes argued that many restrictive arrangements are actually in the distributors' best
interests and that the supplier simply develops and enforces them "for the distributors' own good." It
may indeed be true that some suppliers, through the ability to study the entire market and to consider
a wide range of managerial alternatives, are peculiarly well situated to advise, assist, and even persuade
distributors to follow more profitable operating procedures. However, it presupposes both an undue
omniscience on the part of suppliers and an undue denseness on the part of distributors to argue that
the latter must be continually compelled to follow courses of action in their own best interests.
," A special case of the "market access" motive involves new products, for which the territorial
monopoly may be an important stimulant to investment in promotional activity and risk-taking on the
part of distributors. Use of restrictive arrangements with respect to new products would not explain
their persistence over time; however, the new product case is a powerful argument against per se
prohibition of all customer-territorial restrictions, as the courts have apparently recognized. Cf. United
States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. ig6o), afl'd, 365 U.S. 567 (g6i).
Compare Jerrold Electronics Corp. v. Wescoast Broadcasting Co., 341 F.2d 653 (gth Cir. i965).
"This and the following point are particularly emphasized by Jordan, supra note i, at 113-22.
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appropriate norms and standards or because they can be persuaded to do so in return
for competitive insulation.
A large number of more specific considerations might be listed, but the fore-
going include the principal points in the literature and already involve some duplica-
tion. It may be relevant, however, to ask why a supplier would prefer a restrictive
arrangement to the complete control of a distribution outlet through vertical inte-
gration. Three characteristics of distributive activity are of paramount importance
in this connection. 14  First, distribution is a relatively low-profit activity; if a
supplier can obtain the desired degree of control without assuming full investment
responsibility, he may be able to employ his capital more profitably elsewhere.
Second, distribution is typically a multiproduct activity, with the product mix of
distributors substantially different from that of any one supplier; vertical integration
under these circumstances involves a substantial broadening of a supplier's product
responsibility as well as his functional role. 5 Finally, the local managerial problems
and personal service content of distribution discourage suppliers from integrating
forward when other alternatives are available.'0
III
A MODEL Op CUSTOMER-TEUUToR1AL RESTRICTIONS
The courts have dearly held that at the present time restrictive distribution
practices are not per se illegal in the United States under existing statutes, and we
have cited above a number of legitimate business considerations that might motivate
a supplier of merchandise to introduce restrictive arrangements among his dis-
tributors. It remains, however, to inquire whether or not the introduction of such
arrangements will necessarily, or even probably, result in some reduction in the
strength of competitive forces in the economy. In order to examine this question,
we construct an abstract model of a spatial market and examine the impact of
restrictive practices on this market under certain specified conditions. From the
results of this analysis we are able to suggest some generalizations that might serve
to identify instances of restrictive distribution permissible under a pro-competitive
public policy. 7
"
4 For the most recent general survey of the economics of distribution in the United States, see
REAvrs Cox, DisRIBuTIOro IN A HIGH-LEvEL ECONOMY (1965).
"
5The principal form of retailing in which manufacturers exercise a dominant decision-making role,
including formal vertical integration in some instances, is gasoline marketing; the second most conspicu-
ous example is automobile dealerships. In both instances, the principal product of the supplier is also
the principal product of the retailer. The former do not, in general, involve customer restrictions other
than those arising entirely out of physical location, but the latter have involved very explicit territorial
restraints in the past and continue to do so in some cases. Cf. B. P. PASHIOIAN, THE Dismatrr€oN Os
AuroMoBILs ch. 2 (1961); Travers & Wright, supra note I, and references therein.
10 Similar points are made by Travers & Wright, supra note i, at 834, and Stewart, supra note i, at
38-46.
"Y To interpret the model as a case for customer restrictions by industry, read each "location" as a
different class of customer, with the proximity of locations reflecting the similarity of product require-
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As the framework for our model, assume the existence of a set of potential market
locations evenly distributed along a line in space. Potential customers of different
sizes (size measured by potential volume of purchases) are distributed evenly along
the line, and the size distribution of customers is the same at each location. We
analyze the problem of a single supplier and its associated single-product distributors
in marketing to these potential customers on the assumption that both the final
market price and the distributor price are fixed and uniform over all quantities
and all customers.
Assume next that the establishment of a distributorship involves one particular
amount of capital investment and that the criterion used by distributors in making
this investment is the achievement of a specific minimum net rate of return. Assume
also that the distributors have three types of variable costs:
i. cost of merchandise purchased for resale, which is constant per product unit;
2. cost of customer contact, which is constant per unit of distance between dis-
tributor and customer; and
3. cost of transactions, which is constant per customer.
Under these cost conditions, two propositions hold:
i. at any given location, the profitability of distributor sales to any particular
customer will be directly proportional to customer size,' 8 and
2. for customers of any given size, the profitability of distributor sales will be
inversely proportional to the distance between customer and distributor.'9
We would expect a distributor at any particular location to contact potential
customers at his own location beginning with the largest and continuing down the
size categories until he reached those customers for whom the revenue-cost margin
just equalled the cost of making the transaction. Similarly, we would expect the
distributor to extend his market coverage to customers at other locations to such a
point that the rising contact costs just equalled the net profit (gross margin less
transaction cost) attainable. These two criteria define the intensive and extensive
margins of market exploitation for the distributor, and his submarket may be
described as including all potential customers for whom the revenue-cost margin
ments and distribution channels among classes. The entire argument could also be restated for a single
distributor dealing with a group of suppliers; under appropriate cost and demand assumptions, each
supplier may obtain the same profit whether he distributes through one or many outlets, but the
distributor may benefit from holding an exclusive franchise, even if the result is only to attract
customers to other merchandise.
"s The larger the customer, the greater is the aggregate difference between total receipts from the
sale and total cost of merchandise; deduct from this aggregate the lump-sum cost of making the trans-
action to obtain the net profit per customer, which will be directly proportional to the size of the sale.
9Note that our model includes no source of diseconomies of scale other than the rising contact costs
associated with customers in more distant locations. This assumption reflects the general observation
that there is a significant amount of permanent excess capacity in most distribution activities. Cf. Cox,
op7. ct. supra note 14, ch. 12.
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equals or exceeds the sum of the contact and transaction costs. A diagrammatic
representation of such a submarket, showing both spatial outreach and customer
depth at each spatial location, is presented in figure one.20
FIGURE I
DEVELOPMENT OF A DISTRIBUTOR SUBMARKET BY SPATIAL OUTREACH AND CUSTOMER DEPTH
Market Locations
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For a distributor at location H, the unit price-cost margin, contact costs over space, and transactions cost
determine the spatial limits of the submarket (locations A and 0, where only customers of size zoo arc
serviced) and the depth in terms of customer size (size 25 at location H).
We have assumed that the investment requirements per distributor are fixed
regardless of location, number of customers reached, or volume. If the profits attain-
able from one optimal-sized submarket are greater than would be available from
an equivalent amount of capital employed elsewhere, then, with unrestricted entry,
we would expect additional distributors to appear. Each of them would select a
geographic location such that his spatial outreach did not overlap with any existing
distributor, and the pattern of market coverage that would result is illustrated in
figure two. Note that a large number of potential customers may not be reached by
any distributor under this pattern of coverage.
If the profits obtained from these optimal-sized distributorships were exactly equal
" The model developed here is the simplest possible one that will illustrate the argument. The
spatial dimension of the market is made linear, not circular, as in the more usual example, in order
,to make it possible to illustrate the concept of market "depth" while keeping the diagram to two
dimensions. The triangular limits of the submarket may be interpreted as a vertical cross-section of a
cone, in two-dimensional space. When the spatial market is entirely filled with distributors, as in
figure three below, the spatial (horizontal) boundaries of each submarket would be hexagonal, as
Losch has shown.
The economic literature on "line" and other spatial market models is very large. The single
most important theoretical work is A. Loscs, THE ECONOMICS OF LOCATioN (1954; first published in
German in 1940). Essential early references are E. H. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLisric
COMPETITION Appendices A and C (6th ed. 195o); and Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 EcoN. J'.
41 (1929). The standard general text on spatial economic relationships is E. M. HoovER, THE LocATIoN
oF ECbNoMic AcTIVITY (1948).
A model fundamentally similar to but much more elaborate than that presented in the text is
contained in Mills & Lay, A Model of Marl~et Areas with Free Entry, 72 J. POL. EcoN. 277 (1964).
This model demonstrates in a more general framework that free entry in a spatial market need not
result in the filling of all market spaces nor in the most efficient use of production and transportation
resources.
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FIGURE 2
MARKET OCCUPANCY BY NONCOMPETITIVE DISTRIBUTORS
Market Locations
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to those available from similar investments elsewhere, no additional distributors
would be tempted to enter the market, nor could the supplier induce such entry
without offering to increase distributor profits through distributor price reduction,
subsidy, or other means. However, if the optimal-sized distributors are earning
better than normal profits, additional distributors may wish to enter the market.
The supplier will also desire such distributors to enter because they can provide
additional market coverage. However, wherever such additional distributorships
are established, they will include in their submarkets some of the customers already
served by the optimal-sized outlets. Thus, the attainment of increased market
coverage-desired by the supplier (and by the potential entering distributors)-
involves the development of interdistributor (intrabrand) competition and a re-
duction in the size and profitability of distributorships.
Although new distributors might for a time take customers from established
firms simply on the basis of convenience and without altering the basic price and
cost relationships of the industry, eventually the encroaching outlets and the estab-
lished outlets would begin to compete directly for customers. This competition
might take the form of price reductions, either selective or across-the-board, or
additional expenditures on selling costs. Either form of competition has the same
effect upon distributor profits, reducing them below the level they would have
reached if the same sales volume per distributor were attained without competition.
If the competitive price reductions are market-wide, they will reduce the depth
coverage of the market because they lower the profits available from transactions
with smaller customers2 1 Even if the reductions are only selective, or if selective
selling cost increases are used instead, the profitability of every competitive dis-
tributor in the sale of any given volume of product is reduced. This has an
"s We might term this the "perfect competition" result. It implies that price is the only element
of competition among distributors, and that final market prices fall until each distributor is earning
only normal profits. The spatial market would be full of distributors, but the depth of their coverage
would be reduced. The final numbers-spatial-depth outcome would depend upon the investment re-
quirement and cost structure.
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important implication for the supplier. It means-and here is the point-that with
direct competition among distributors, their number and size may stabilize so as
to provide a lower level of market coverage than a restrictive distribution arrange-
ment would permit; thus, the total sales of the supplier's product in the final market
may be reduced under competitive, as compared to restricted, distribution arrange-
ments.
For this reason alone, in a market corresponding to our simple model, a supplier
would be well advised to restrict the customers and territories served by his dealers
so that they might obtain normal profits on their operations under conditions that
result in levels of market coverage, selling price, and sales quantity that maximize
his own profits. Since competition will govern the returns of distributors in any
event, the supplier has reason to prefer (and the distributors no reason to disprefer)
that normal profits be obtained by a maximum number of distributors, resulting in
a maximum total sales volume, given the price 2 The resulting pattern of dis-
tributor market occupancy is pictured in figure three.
Two conceptual simplifications involved in this model deserve brief comment.
First, we have discussed the introduction of distributors into the market as if it
occurred gradually over some time period. From the viewpoint of a decision-
making supplier, the situation might be better described in terms of a forecast of
possible market developments. Second, we have omitted any consideration of the
existence of other suppliers and their associated distributors in the market. Although
the number and strength of such competitors raises plenty of management problems,
their presence or absence has no great impact on our argument. Either (a) there
are no direct competitors, and the potential customers will simply spend their money
on other products or increase their savings if the supplier's product is not made
available to them, or (b) there are direct competitors such that any sales of this
supplier's product are matched by lost sales of another's-or else some combination
of (a) and (b) prevails. Whatever the circumstances, if the customers are assumed
to have any judgment or taste in the matter, their selection of the particular supplier's
product reflects a preference for it over the available alternatives, including the
" Criteria for the selection of an optimal final market price, total quantity, and number of distributor-
ships by the supplier may be briefly indicated. Larger numbers of distributorships are associated with
higher levels of market demand at all final prices; and every size (and, therefore, total number) of
distributorship(s) is associated with a particular gross distributor's margin per sales unit, determined
by the distributor's capital requirement and minimum rate of return. The supplier would obtain his
own net market demand schedules by subtracting the relevant minimum unit margin from each
possible final demand schedule, determined by the number of distributors. The optimal number of
distributors from the supplier's viewpoint would be that resulting in the highest of these net demand
schedules, and the supplier would select the price-quantity combination on this schedule best calculated
to maximize his own profits over the market period. A supplier with significant monopoly power in
the final market may even increase the number of distributors beyond that compatible with the
maintenance of normal profits, either by (a) subsidization, so long as gross profits from increased
coverage are greater than subsidy costs, or (b) raising final market price and distributor's unit margin
through resale price maintenance. For a diagrammatic development of this point, under slightly
different cost conditions from those assumed here, see Gould & Preston, supra note 8.
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alternative of saving their money. Thus, there is every reason to believe that the
customer population is not directly harmed, and quite possibly benefited, by the
establishment of a maximum number of viable distributorships. Whether the
establishment of additional distributorships results in an over-commitment of
resources to distributive activity in the economy, or in an excessive turnover of
management and capital due to bankruptcies, are questions we do not investigate
here.
Let us now summarize some principal features of the application of customer-
territorial restrictions within this simple model:
i. Referring back to our earlier list of motivations for restrictive distribution,
the example presented in our model covers the first two motivations (obtaining mar-
ket access and increasing exposure) exactly. It also has implications, as noted below,
for the third and fourth (increasing sales effort and controlling service quality).
2. The supplier obtains the best possible coverage of the market, given the
structure of distribution costs, and is thus in a position to obtain the best available
over-all price-quantity combinations. If competition among suppliers (i.e., among
brands) is strong in the final market, then the best available alternative may simply
be competitive returns for the supplier himself. On the other hand, if interbrand
competition is weak, the supplier may be able to establish a higher final market price
and, deducting normal profits for distributors, obtain an abnormal profit for himself.
3. The distributors receive only normal profits and are as small and numerous as
possible consistent with the price and margin established by the supplier. There is
no inconsistency between this result, which arises directly out of the general argu-
ment of our model that restrictive arrangements increase the number of distributors
over what it otherwise would be, and the superficial effect of restrictions in limiting
or reducing the number of distributors. The difference lies in the character of the
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distributive outlets, their costs, locations, and functions. Our analysis indicates that
restrictive arrangements will be used to increase the number of outlets of a specified
type or quality; the preservation of such outlets may, of course, require the elimina-
tion of potentially competitive outlets with other operating and service characteristics.
4. The distributors can be made better off only if the supplier is made worse off
and the restrictions are maintained. The removal of restrictions may allow the size
and activity of distributors to change but not their profitability. However, if re-
strictions are maintained but prices raised or markets widened, then distributors
may gain while the supplier loses. (Skillful bargaining may allow the distributors
to obtain some of these gains as their reward for cooperating with the supplier's
plans, even though they could not do as well acting independently.)
5. The welfare of final customers is not clearly affected by the selection of
restrictive over nonrestrictive distribution arrangements in this model. If competi-
tion took the form of selling expenses or free services, these might benefit particular
customers, annoy others, or be of no importance. If competition took the form of
price reductions, either general or selective, those customers receiving the reductions
would benefit. However, whatever the form of competition, there would be some
reduction in the coverage of the market as compared to that provided by restricted
distribution, because of the reduction in number of distributors if for no other
reason. Thus, the gains to favored customers must be measured against the loss of
market alternatives to others willing to pay but shifted beyond the breakeven
margins by the change in distributor costs. The extension of service to these cus-
tomers contributes to their own welfare as well as to supplier profits; even if these
customers are reached by other suppliers of similar products, the provision of an
additional market alternative cannot be dismissed as negligible in all cases.
6. Note that in this model the supplier can do nothing to extend the intensive
market margin (the depth of coverage) of distributors directly. However, dis-
tributors whose range of territorial outreach is sharply limited may find it possible
to extend service to extra-marginal customers within their own sales territories on a
price-discrimination or reduced-cost basis (which raises some other legal problems, of
course). These possibilities are not easily included in our simple model, but they are
probably real enough in actual markets to constitute an important side effect of
restricted distribution arrangements.2 3
In our abstract model, the competitive structure of distribution limits dis-
"The manipulation of our model has been greatly simplified by the assumption that only a single
amount of investment was required to establish a distributorship, regardless of capacity, location, and so
on. This assumption is probably acceptable as a reflection of some minimum level of distributive
capacity, and even of capital requirements within each of several size classes of distributors. However,
if a distributor in our model can select some level of investment lower than that required to reach
an optimal-sized market, he may choose to do so. Such a reduction will raise the rate of return repre-
sented by any particular aggregate of dollar profits. The reduction may or may not reduce the
distributor's ability to cover his own territorial market in depth; if it does, then the supplier may
be motivated to introduce additional stimuli---aids, subsidies, or quotas-to maintain depth coverage.
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tributors' profits to normal levels, with or without territorial restrictions, and thus
the distributors are assumed to be indifferent as between independence and restricted
arrangements. In fact, of course, they may have strong preferences between the
two and will almost certainly have preferences as to the particular forms that
restrictions may take. Not only are there the extreme possibilities of a monopolistic
price-fixing conspiracy among the distributors on the one hand and the reduction
of profits below normal levels by a coercive supplier on the other, there are myriad
variants in between. If "the greatest of all monopoly profits is a quiet life," the
closed territory distributor may value his position for that reason alone. Further,
in the process of establishing and maintaining an optimal system of territorial dis-
tribution, a supplier may provide extensive managerial and investment assistance,
advertising support, and so forth. These forms of aid may be provided at little or
no direct cost to the distributor, both because they are undertaken by the supplier
in the pursuit of profits from complete market coverage and because their costs, per
distributor, are in fact very low for the supplier as a result of scale economies.
IV
A POLICY STANDARD FOR REsmncivzr ARRANGEMENTS
In the language of the Addyston Pipe case, restrictive distribution arrangements
are reasonable, and therefore permissible, under the Sherman Act when "the
restraint is such only as to afford a fair protection to the interests of the party in
favour of whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere with the interests of
the public."24  The analysis of customer-territorial restrictions developed from our
model enables us to propose that this criterion be specified more precisely in this
two-part test:
Restrictive arrangements imposed upon distributors individually by a supplier
are permissible when-
I. they make possible, with no direct reduction in the availability of products
of other suppliers, a level of market coverage for the supplier's product
substantially greater than could be attained with overlapping distributor-
ships, and
2. they do not result in distributor or supplier profits substantially different
from "normal" levels for the risk, skill, and capital involved.
The first part of this test examines the impact of the arrangement on the availability
of product and outlet alternatives in the final market and the importance of com-
petitive costs. The second discriminates between the permissible cases and those
involving horizontal collusion among distributors, coercion of captive distributors
by suppliers, and vertical restrictions supporting a supply monopoly. The key word
" United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898), quoting Chief
justiee Tindal, in Homer v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735, 743, 131 Eng. Rep. 284, 287 (C.P. 1831).
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in the second part of the test is result; it is not enough that restrictive practices may
occur in a context of abnormal profits-there must be some cause-effect relationship
between the two.
The simplest case covered by our proposed test-in which neither distributors nor
supplier earns abnormal profits but the restrictive arrangement permits extensive
market coverage and widens the range of competitive alternatives-would seem
fanciful were it not apparently illustrated in a number of recent court proceedings,
to which we shall refer specifically below. But what about the more difficult case
in which the first criterion is met and there is no evidence of excessive profits or
horizontal conspiracy among distributors but supplier profits are abnormally high?
The answer depends upon whether or not the supplier profits can be traced to the
restrictive arrangement. If the arrangement centers on price maintenance, the
supposition of a cause-effect relationship is quite strong. It is possible, but experience
suggests very unlikely, that distributor prices are being held up while supplier
prices and profits are being held down. On the contrary, one of the classic motives
for resale price control is to insulate the supplier from the forces of price competition
among distributors and, indeed, to enlist them as partners in the pursuit of monopoly
profits.
With customer-territorial restrictions considered alone, however, the supposition
seems to run the other way. Their effects upon the level of final market price are,
at most, indirect and may run in either direction. They do not contribute to the
weakening of the interbrand competition in final markets or serve as barriers to
entry. On the contrary, they assure a prospective competitor that in any sub-
market he will have only one, rather than many, distributors of a particular
supplier's product to contend with.
Our test does not specifically cover a particular type of restrictive arrangement
that we have omitted from the body of our analysis, namely, the reservation of
certain territorial or, more commonly, customer groups (e.g., governmental units)
for direct service by the supplier. This pattern of distribution has traditionally
given rise to a considerable amount of complaint among the distributors affected. 21
Such practices may indeed reduce the profits of distributors below what they other-
wise would be, and the post hoc reservation of new customers initially developed
by the distributors may constitute illegitimate coercion or interference. However,
where post hoc coercion is not involved, such reservations do not appear to have
an anticompetitive effect. Given that the entire flow of merchandise originates
with the supplier, his reservation of some part of that flow for his own use, in-
cluding use in sales to selected final users, cannot be shown to have any necessary
impact, either positive or negative, on the over-all strength of competitive forces.
The case against customer-territorial restrictions where suppliers are profitable
25 Cf. Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Small Business on the Impact Upon Small
Business of Dual Distribution and Related Vertical Integration, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
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or relatively large" appears to rest on an association between these restrictions and
parallel limitations on the range of products marketed by a distributor, i.e., exclusive
dealing. Exclusive dealing is, indeed, the obverse of customer-territorial restriction,
and there may well be cases in which a supplier desires not primarily the increased
market coverage posited in our model but rather the elimination of interbrand
competition within individual distribution outlets. The territorial restriction is then
the distributor's quid pro quo; if he is to give up the distribution of competitive
products, he must be guaranteed a market in which intrabrand competition is
eliminated. In arranging such distributorships, the supplier would, of course, be
motivated to obtain maximum market coverage, as suggested by our model; how-
ever, the analysis of the operation of such a distribution system would include its
exclusive feature as well. This feature may well constitute a barrier to the develop-
ment of new competition, and thus may contribute to the achievement of non-
competitive price and profit levels for both distributors and suppliers. If so, the
exclusive dealing aspects of the arrangement would be, and should be, illegal under
section 3 of the Clayton Act0 7
The test of the permissiveness of restrictive arrangements set forth above is not
intended as an across-the-board challenge of the per se rule against vertical price-
fixing nor of the Clayton Act's restraints on exclusive dealing and tying. It is,
however, intended to suggest that the impact of particular restrictive practices
depends upon their context, including their association with other practices, and
thus that an extension of per se rules in this area is at present unjustified. More
explicit regulations in the trade practices field might arise from either the simplistic
extension of per se illegality to all restrictive practices or the identification of par-
ticular characteristics of firms and/or markets for which particular practices would
be permitted or prohibited. Possible characteristics cited include (a) the profitability
and market share of the supplier firm and (b) the number and strength of alterna-
tive suppliers in intermediate and final markets.28 The preceding analysis has
"e For example, Travers & Wright, supra note i, at 832-34.
"' Under the Standard Stations doctrine, the legal status of exclusive dealing arrangements appears
to turn entirely on "proof that competition has been foreclosed in a substantial share of the line of
commerce affected." Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949). The Court has
subsequently pointed out, however, that application of this doctrine involves three separable steps:
(z) determination of the "line of commerce," (2) demonstration of actual or "threatened foreclosure
of competition [in relation to] the market affected," and (3) demonstration that "the competition
foreclosed . . . constitute[s] a substantial share of the relevant market." Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nash-
ville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327, 328 (i96i). For an analysis of the current status of this doctrine,
see Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive Arrangements Under the Clayton Act,
1961 Sup. Cr. REv. 267.
"aTravers & Wright, supra note z. An additional characteristic sometimes mentioned is the
strength and form of sanctions included in the restrictive arrangements. Harsh sanctions, such as
revocations of franchise and fines (either direct or in the form of a profit pass-through), would render
agreements invalid, but those containing only weak penalties or admonitions would be permitted. The
distinction being drawn appears to be that between arrangements that are restrictive in substance and
those that are only restrictive in form. This criterion may be useful for rejecting particular arrange-
ments as not requiring serious analysis (because of no effect); however, it is of no use in discriminating
among cases in which substantive restraints are, in fact, involved.
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already dealt, at least by inference, with the relevance of the first group of char-
acteristics; we now turn briefly to the second.
In considering the number and strength of alternative suppliers, brands, or
products in affected markets as a determinant of the permissibility of restrictive
practices, we would distinguish sharply between the criteria applicable to exclusive
dealing or resale price maintenance, on the one hand, and customer-territorial
restrictions on the other. The presence of few alternatives in a product-line or
market may indicate that exclusive dealing arrangements have, in fact, already
worked to foreclose channels of market access. At a minimum, a pro-competitive
public policy would suggest that no barriers be placed on the introduction of new
products or brands into small-numbers markets. Similarly, the power to raise
prices through resale price maintenance is heavily dependent upon the strength of
competitive alternatives; thus, where these alternatives are weak, the possibility of
pernicious effects from price control are strong, and vice versa. By contrast, our
analysis of customer-territorial restrictions indicates that they may be used to extend
market coverage and thereby increase the range of competitive alternatives available
to particular customers. Such an increase may have its greatest value, from a public
policy viewpoint, in those markets where the number of competitive alternatives is
very small. This point is frequently recognized with respect to the introduction of
new products and constitutes a kind of "infant industry" defense of business practices
otherwise proscribed. However, it is equally if not more important in the main-
tenance of competitive strength for existing products. It may be argued that the
mere presence of customer-territorial restrictions reduces the flexibility and adapt-
ability of marketing organizations over time and thus contributes to the perpetuation
of dominant market positions (and excessive profits) for particular suppliers or
distributors. However, any such vague theorizing must be countered by the (equally
vague) consideration of potential cost reductions, service improvements, and dealer
responsibility and continuity attainable within stable organizational structures.
There is one final point to be made in defense of certain restrictive distribution
arrangements. With a few exceptions, there is, at present, no explicit public policy
commitment for the freezing of particular patterns of marketing organization or
particular divisions of aggregate profits among raw materials producers, manufac-
turers, merchandisers, and distributors and their various sources of labor and
materials. Because there is no general public policy stance in opposition to
organizational changes brought about by vertical integration (including bona fide
agency agreements) not involving mergers, the prohibition of certain interfirm
arrangements may stimulate the absorption of market relationships into intrafirm
management decisions through integration.29 Integration is more likely when a
distributor can operate efficiently while marketing the products of a single supplier,
and this same market characteristic is promotive of exclusive dealing and restrictive
31ALMAnIN PimLups, MARxET STRucir=E, ORGANIZATION AND PERFORMANCE chs. io-iu (x962).
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customer arrangements (but not particularly of price restrictions, it should be noted).
If the only serious argument against noncollusive marketing restraints is that they
may have a general tendency to rigidify market relationships and reduce competitive
flexibility over the long term, the substitution of vertically integrated structures does
not appear to be a desirable alternative. On the other hand, the prohibition of
changes in vertical marketing patterns might introduce an inflexibility into the
system equal to or greater than that associated with vertical integration itself.
Thus, the continued permissibility of limited restraints, always subject to examina-
tion as a result of complaints by injured parties or the finding of public authorities,
may make possible the most desirable attainable combination of competitive market-
ing structure and behavior.
V
Tim STANDARD APPLIED
The final task of this paper is to illustrate the applicability of the principles set
forth above to some specific marketing situations. For this purpose we have selected
four recent court cases in which question was raised as to the legality of restrictive
distribution arrangements. This attempt at application is somewhat dangerous,
since neither time nor available data have permitted an exhaustive study of the
facts of particular cases, nor can this brief presentation include a detailed state-
ment of all necessary qualifications. However, we choose to incur the risk because
application will clarify the intended limits of the public policy standard set forth
above and thus facilitate its critical appraisal.
A. The White Motor Case30
The Department of Justice brought suit against the White Motor Co., a manu-
facturer of trucks, contending that its franchise agreements constituted per se
restraints of trade under the Sherman Act. White franchisees were restricted as
to their sales areas, customers, and resale prices; the restrictions applied at both an in-
termediate "distributor" level and a subsequent "dealer" level of the marketing organ-
ization. The Department asked, and the district court granted, summary judgment
that the arrangement was illegal. The Supreme Court, however, held that the
summary judgment was not justified, except in regard to price fixing, because
this is the first case involving a territorial restriction in a vertical arrangement; and
we know too little of the actual impact of both that restriction and the one respect-
ing customers to reach a conclusion on the bare bones of the documentary evidence
before us.3 '
1o White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), reversing 194 P. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio
1963). The lower court proceeding in this case is briefly summarized in Travers & Wright, supra
note x, at 797-8ox. An important comment supporting the view presented in the text is to be found in
Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 112 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 159, 161-70 (1963).81 372 U.S. at 261.
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The case was remanded to the district court for trial, and eighteen months later
a consent judgment was entered under which White, in essence, agreed to dis-
continue the restrictions on its franchisees' sales territories and customers.3 2 Thus,
the impact of the entire proceeding on White's marketing activity was substantially
the same as if the summary judgment had been upheld.
White Motor is among the ioo largest industrial firms in the United States (rank-
ing ninety-eighth in order of sales in Fortune's 1963 list)33 and among the ten largest
firms engaged in production of motor vehicles and equipment, although it is less
than one-fifth the size of Chrysler, the smallest of the big three auto producers, and
less than one twenty-fifth the size of General Motors. It is, however, the largest
firm specializing primarily in truck production, the next largest being Mack Truck.
International Harvester is the other principal competitor in the relevant market.
White is thus neither the dominant firm in its industry nor a pygmy newcomer en-
gaged in a battle with the giants. In arguing that the case required a trial on its
merits, White stated that its territorial restraints were necessary to the maintenance
of its distribution network in competition with that of other manufacturers:
The plain fact is, as we expect to be able to show to the satisfaction of the Court at
a trial of this case on the merits, that the outlawing of exclusive distributorships and
dealerships in specified territories would reduce competition in the sale of motor
trucks and not foster such competition.34
It also contended that its customer restrictions, which prohibited franchisees from
soliciting business from governments and certain large accounts, were designed to
permit White Motor sales representatives to deal directly with these accounts in
competition with similar representatives from other truck manufacturers. The resale
price restrictions were said to be ancillary, having as their purpose the maintenance
of a particular discount structure for the various classes of accounts.
Leaving the price restrictions aside as per se violations whether or not they had
any specific anticompetitive impact in this instance, it would appear that the condi-
tions as set forth by White Motor would, if true, satisfy the standards for per-
missible customer-territorial restrictions presented in the body of this paper. The
effects of the territorial restrictions in increasing the number of dealerships, extent
of market coverage, and, therefore, the range of competitive alternatives in the
covered markets, seem to have been clearly recognized by the Supreme Court and
particularly by Mr. Justice Brennan in his concurrence35 Justice Brennan, however,
makes explicit objection to the customer reservations placed upon White franchisees,
which we would defend. White's right to distribute all of its products through
wholly-owned distribution outlets is unquestioned; however, Justice Brennan
" United States v. White Motor Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1964 Trade Cas.) 7z195 (N.D. Ohio,
Sept. 8, 1964).
"aFortune, July 1964, p. x82.
"' Quoted in 372 U.S. at 257.
"aid. at 264-75.
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accuses White of seeking "the best of both worlds-to retain a distribution system
for the general run of its customers, while skimming off the cream of the trade for
its own direct sales. That, it seems to me, the antitrust laws would not permit."3
The logic of this position is not evident. Although White's specific justifications for
this practice may be criticized, the fact remains that neither in economic theory nor
in law is there any particular connection between the extent of vertical integration
and the strength of final market competition. The implication of Justice Brennan's
position seems to be that customer reservation is in some way unfair to distributors,
but how these distributors would be made better off by the elimination of their
distributorships and the transference of all White's sales activities into vertically in-
tegrated outlets is not specified. By our standard, and on the basis of the limited
information available, the White Motor distribution system, apart from its resale
price restrictions, would have been permissible. 7
B. The Sandura Case 8
Sandura Co. is a relatively small producer (1962 sales of $ii million) of
medium- to low-priced hard-surface vinyl floor coverings. It is engaged in competi-
tion with Armstrong Cork, Congoleum-Nairn, and Pabco, major producers of hard-
surface floor coverings, and with a wide range of alternative products and floor
treatments as well. The company's principal product, Sandran, is an inexpensive
and easily installed vinyl produced by a patented rotogravure process, which was
first placed on the market in 1949. After a rapid sales growth, the product revealed
serious technical flaws, and sales deteriorated substantially as a result. After
remedying these defects, the company again launched a program of expanded
distribution. The expansion was accomplished under great financial restriction, due
to the heavy losses on sales and repossessions of defective merchandise. Almost no
funds were available for advertising, and, indeed, the distributors and retailers were
expected to take on primary responsibility for sales promotion and merchandising.
Sandura offered its distributors closed territories, within each of which the desig-
nated firm would have exclusive right to sell Sandura products to retail dealers,
and limited retail competition by restricting the resale prices at which its products
could be sold.
The Federal Trade Commission charged that the entire distributorship program
constituted an unfair method of competition in violation of the Federal Trade Com-
Id. at 274.
s White's franchise agreements also included an exclusive dealership clause, such that each franchisee
agreed not to handle competitive products. Although this clause was probably irrelevant with respect
to the trucks themselves, it may have had some restrictive effect with respect to parts or accessories.
These arrangements were explicitly not held to be per se illegal in the district court, and thus did not
come to the attention of the Supreme Court; nor is this exclusive arrangement reached by the consent
decree.
5 5 Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964), affirming 61 F.T.C. 756 (3962). See also
Stone, Closed Territorial Distribution: An Opening Question in the Sherman Act, 30 U. Cm. L. REV. 286
(x963).
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mission Act.89 The hearing examiner found that the evidence failed to establish
any injury to competition but held that the arrangement was illegal per se, and the
Commission affirmed this view.40 The Commission's decision appears to rest
importantly upon the view that the territorial arrangements were intrinsic elements
in a retail price-fixing scheme that was per se illegal. On the appeal, however, the
court of appeals pointed out that the dealer franchise plan establishing resale price
maintenance antedated the territorial distribution system and did not appear to be
directly connected with it. Thus, although the Commission was entirely justified
in its findings with respect to price fixing, the court found that "closed territories
made for the vigor and health of Sandura, increasing the competitive good that
flows from interbrand competition without any showing of detriment to intrabrand
competition."'" The court explicitly observed, with respect to the possible inference
of horizontal conspiracy, that "no distributor is shown to have made unreasonable
profits" and "the mere fact that distributors refuse to handle a product without
closed territories is not sufficient basis for finding a horizontal conspiracy among
them." In modifying the Commission's opinion, the court concluded that "this
case is barren of credible evidence that the public would be benefited by requiring
that Sandura distributors be allowed to intrude on each other's territory .... [O]n
this record, the only justified conclusion is that elimination of the closed territory
arrangement would impair competition, rather than foster it."'42
The conclusions of the court of appeals in this case are so clearly aligned with
that of the preceding argument that further comment is not required.43
C. The Schwinn Case44
Arnold, Schwinn & Co. (Schwinn) is a family-owned corporation engaged in
the manufacture of bicycles, parts, and accessories. It has one manufacturing plant
in Chicago and accounted for 22.5 per cent of the United States bicycle market in
1951 and 12.8 per cent in i961. During that time, its marketing organization in-
cluded distributors (wholesalers) and franchised retailers. Each of the former were
allocated closed sales territories, and each of the latter was prohibited from pur-
chasing from distributors outside the territory to which they were assigned. The
enforcement of this arrangement was greatly facilitated by the "Schwinn Plan,"
under which distributors simply made sales contacts with retailers, who were then
supplied directly from the factory. Distributors received a sales commission under
this plan, which accounted for roughly one-half of Schwinn's sales. Consignment
" 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4r-46, 47-58 (1964).
40339 F.2d at 855.
"Id. at 858.
42 Id. at 858-59.
4 A similar analysis and conclusion could be offered for the court of appeals decision in Snap-on-Tools
Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7 th Cir. 1963).
"United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill. x965).
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selling and bona fide agency arrangements were also used in some instances. Final
retail sales prices were forcefully suggested by Schwinn. In 1958, the Department
of Justice complained that these distribution arrangements, "all aspects of which
are so completely interwoven and interinvolved as to constitute one, over-all, nation-
wide combination and conspiracy,"45 violated section i of the Sherman Act.
The district court found no convincing evidence of price-fixing conspiracy.
Further, the court noted strong similarity in the arrangements Schwinn had made
with respect to franchised distribution and the intrafirm arrangements made by
"its giant bicycle competitors, Sears, Roebuck and Co., and Montgomery Ward and
Co."4 and found no fault with franchising as such. However, after an extensive
review of the economics of bicycle distribution and Schwinn's own marketing
analysis conducted over a period of years, the court found that, although "the general
picture . . . of territorialization-one distributor for a general area, and one retail
dealer for a particular locality- . .. is sound economically and perfectly legal,' 4 7 the
pattern by which territories had been divided among distributors was essentially
one of horizontal conspiracy. "Schwinn has a right to assign primary responsibility
to a distributor in an area or territory" and the rights of a principal in any bona
fide agency arrangement.
However, when a distributor fills orders from warehouse stock that he has pur-
chased ... he is acting as an owner .... It matters not that no actual damage has
been shown to any distributor or dealer. Such division of territory by agreement
between distributors is horizontal in nature, and whether agreed upon after being
imposed or even merely suggested from above . . . by the manufacturer does not
alter its illegality . . .4
It is difficult to distinguish the Schwinn arrangement, taken at face value, from
that in Sandura or White Motor. However, it appears that a careful examination
would reveal that the Schwinn arrangement is proscribed under our proposed stan-
dard. The crucial question is the first part of our two-part test: Does the arrangement
increase market coverage over what it otherwise would be? From the findings of
fact summarized in the opinion of the district court, there appears to be no problem
in obtaining adequate market coverage for Schwinn cycles. On the contrary, it
would appear that Schwinn is one of the leading producers of quality bicycles in
the country, and its products are in demand throughout the distribution system.
Thus, terriorialization does not appear to extend Schwinn's markets in any way
but simply to reduce possible competitive contacts between Schwinn distributors and
dealers. Whether this reduction in competition has any effect on profits we are not
'Id. at 326.
"Id. at 334.
"Id. at 340.
"Id. at 342.
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able to determine from the material available, but this issue is only secondary under
the circumstances. 49
D. The Sealy Case"0
Sealy, Inc., is a patent and trade-mark holding corporation engaged in the busi-
ness of licensing bedding manufacturers to produce and sell mattresses, foundations,
and other bedding items under the Sealy name. Under the licensing agreements,
manufacturers were restricted both as to their geographical sales areas for Sealy-
labeled products and as to their resale prices. The Department of Justice charged
that these arrangements were per se illegal under section x of the Sherman Act.
The district court accepted the Department's view with respect to the price-fixing
arrangements, but upheld Sealy's contention that the territorial restrictions were
"merely ancillary to ... several entirely legitimate business purposes ... ,,l
The history and internal organization of the Sealy organization are reviewed
in some detail in the opinion, and that review cannot be repeated here. However,
it is essential to note that the principal Scaly licensees were also stockholders and
directors of the holding company. Thus, holding company decisions as to prices
and territories were to a considerable extent horizontal agreements among some of
the parties involved. Although parties to a particular territorial dispute were ex-
cluded from its final adjudication at the corporate level even when the parties
were directors or members of the executive committee, the continuous interaction of
licensees in the determination and realignment of territories is evident from the
record. Sealy did not restrict its licensees from the production of bedding under
their own or other labels, nor did the territorial restrictions apply to sales of such
products; the effect of restrictive agreements in one product line on the manufac-
turers' policies with respect to others is not revealed in the material at hand.
It would appear that the Sealy arrangement would not be permissible under
our proposed standard. It is true, as the court observed, that the history of Sealy
shows a continuous expansion in the number of licensees and in the extent of
market coverage. What the evidence does not appear to show, however, is that the
territorial restriction contributed to this expansion, except insofar as it supported
the price-fixing scheme. This may suggest that the territorial restraints, in them-
selves, are of negligible significance; indeed, the initial territorial limits appear
to have been set in terms of break-even freight rate comparisons (i.e., "natural
markets"). The "entirely legitimate business purposes" for which the territorial
restraints were established and maintained, according to the court, were "royalty
'"The Schwinn case is a likely one for the substitution of quasi-integration, through agency
agreements, for territorial restrictions; however, the restrictive arrangement cannot be defended on this
ground alone.
"
0 United States v. Scaly, Inc., 1964 Trade Cas. 71258 (N.D. Il.), appeal docketed, 33 U.S.L.
WEEK 3404 (U.S. June 9, x965) (No. 238).
,' Id. at 80073.
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income... and the benefits to licensees of joint purchasing, research, engineering, ad-
vertising and merchandising." 52 However, nowhere in the opinion is the associa-
tion made clear between these "purposes" and the restraints themselves, except in
so far as the "purposes" were realized through the illegal price-fixing arrangement.
Therefore, on the basis of the material available, it would appear that the territorial
restrictions had, in fact, significance only as part of the over-all price-fixing con-
spiracy and have no justification for continued existence. The tolerance of the
court for these restraints may, in fact, rest upon an assumption that, in the absence
of the price-fixing arrangement, the ancillary restraints are purely formal. However,
the possibility that these arrangements might serve as a substitute for the pricing
agreement, or that they may otherwise restrain the behavior of the parties with
respect to their own-brand products, suggests that the territorial restraints them-
selves may have significant anticompetitive impact.
E. Concluding Comment
The joining of territorial restrictions with price-fixing agreements in all of these
cases, and in many other marketing arrangements as well, suggests the possibility
of "guilt by association," and such associations no doubt lend support to extensions
of per se rules of illegality to cover all restrictive marketing practices. However,
the record to date is hardly conclusive. It may be that the continued accumulation
of evidence will show that the great bulk of restrictive agreements fall within the
Sealy-Schwinn format, in which territorial restraints do not appear to offer any
expansion in the strength or scope of competitive forces. If so, a per se rule would
be justified in terms of judicial clarity and managerial convenience. On the other
hand, the White and Sandura evidence indicates that there are instances where, at
a minimum, there is a strong presumption on the other side. This brief review
of recent case material suggests the necessity for continuing detailed scrutiny of each
case on its merits and the development of formal rules only after many more in-
stances have been subjected to detailed examination. Although it can be easily
argued that, as a matter of public policy, a minimum of restraints should be allowed
on the working of the competitive enterprise economy, the concept of restraint must
include not only limitations placed upon one private party by another but also
limitations placed upon private parties by governments and courts.
Id. at 80083.
